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COMMENT
Real Property-Tenancy by the Entirety in North Carolina: An
Idea Whose Time Has Gone?
As long ago as 1906, the Chief Justice of the North Carolina
Supreme Court characterized tenancy by the entirety as an anomaly.'
Today this anomaly still exists in North Carolina much as it did at
common law.' Only in Massachusetts and Michigan is tenancy by the
entirety preserved in as pure a form as in North Carolina.' The estate
has always been a stumbling block to recovery for creditors of either
1. Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 53 S.E. 478 (1906) (Clark, C.J.).
2. L. & M. Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 550, 161 S.E.2d 23,26 (1968); Harris v. Parker,
17 N.C. App. 606, 610, 195 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Page v. Donnelly, 346 Mass. 768, 193 N.E.2d 682 (1963); MacNeil v. MacNeil,
312 Mass. 183, 43 N.E.2d 667 (1942); DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d 38 (1954);
In re Estate of Thomas, 341 Mich. 158, 67 N.W.2d 85 (1956).
A number of western states such as Texas and California adopted community property sys-
tems and never recognized tenancy by the entirety. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q.
24, 31 (1951). This nonrecognition may be explained by the living conditions of the period. "[I]n
many colonies the woman tended to occupy a position of practical equality because of her equal
participation in all of the activities essential to survival." 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY T 117, at 450 (P. Rohan ed. 1977). Several other states, namely Connecticut, Nebraska and
Ohio, never recognized tenancy by the entirety because of its inconsistency with judicial interpre-
tations of the common law of those states. Phipps, supra, at 32. The remaining states adopted the
estate in some form because "[t]he early English view of woman's complete lack of capacity as to
instruments affecting the ownership of land persisted ... at some places and as to some aspects of
the law." I R. POWELL, supra, § 117, at 450.
All states, however, eventually enacted Married Women's Property Acts. See 41 Am. Jur. 2d
§§ 29-31 (1968). These statutes awarded married women control over their separate property and
the power to contract, sue and be sued with respect to this property. Phipps, supra, at 27.
With the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, courts were faced with the question
whether the rights granted to married women by these statutes extended to all property interests,
joint as well as separate. The answers of the states were not uniform. The courts of fifteen states
decided that entirety estates could no longer be created because of their inconsistency with the
Married Women's Property Acts (Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, South Carolina and Wisconsin) or with the Acts in combination with other legislation
(Georgia, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and West Virginia). Phipps, supra, at
29, 33. The courts of these states interpreted the statutes to destroy the "unity of person" of Hand
Won which tenancy by the entirety depended for its justification. See, e.g., Walthall v. Goree, 36
Ala. 728, 735 (1860) ("Both of the grantees being capable of taking separately, it is impossible that
they should take by entireties, as if they constituted a single person."); Green v. Cannady, 77 S.C.
193, 201, 57 S.E. 832, 835 (1907) ("We think it was within the design and effect of the separate
estate legislation to destroy the oneness of husband and wife as to property rights, and therefore
that a married woman may become a tenant in common with her husband in property upon a
grant to both.").
Courts in Massachusetts, Michigan and North Carolina, however, reasoned that the silence of
their legislatures on the question of tenancy by the entirety implied an intent that the estate be
unaffected by the statute. Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219, 4 N.E. 824 (1886); Morrill v. Morrill,
138 Mich. 112, 101 N.E. 209 (1904); Long v. Barnes, 87 N.C. 329 (1882). The characteristics of
tenancy by the entirety derived, reasoned these courts, not from any individual status of the par-
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spouse4 and for tort plaintiffs suing a wife for injuries suffered on en-
tirety property.5 In other states, tenants themselves have recently at-
tacked the constitutionality of the estate, 6 and the North Carolina
version of the estate may be vulnerable to attack as well. Additionally,
a line of tax cases strongly suggests that a North Carolina husband who
transfers appreciated entirety property to his wife pursuant to a divorce
settlement will suffer undesirable tax consequences by having to recog-
nize gain on the transfer.7 For all of these reasons, North Carolina
should abolish or alter this outmoded estate.
Tenancy by the entirety developed at common law as a unique
way for a husband and wife, who were considered to be one flesh, to
hold property jointly. Both present and future rights in this estate
vested at once, not in separate persons, but in a metaphysical entity, the
"entirety." Like parties to a joint tenancy, entirety tenants had a survi-
vorship right; unlike a joint tenant's right, however, the entirety ten-
ant's survivorship right could not be defeated. The problem of what to
do if the entirety should be dissolved by a divorce never came up, as
absolute divorce was not recognized. Like a corporation, however, an
entirety had to conduct itself; at common law, it could only conduct
itself through H because married women were legally nonexistent.
Married women could not convey property, contract, sue, or be sued;
ties to the tenancy, but from the marital state itself. Because H had a duty to support and a right
to control Wproperty owned by the marital unit logically should be controlled by him.
In North Carolina the property rights of married women were apparently assured in the
Constitution of 1868:
[t]he real and personal property of any female in this State, acquired before marriage,
and all property, real and personal, to which she may after marriage, become in any
manner entitled, shall be and remain the sole and separate estate and property of such
female. . . and may be devised or bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her hus-
band, conveyed, by her as if she were unmarried.
N.C. CONST. Art. X, § 6 (amended 1956, deleting "with the written assent of her husband" and
substituting "subject to such requirements and limitations as the General Assembly may pre-
scribe" for "as if she were unmarried"), the North Carolina Supreme Court, however, interpreted
this constitutional guarantee in Long v. Barnes, 87 N.C. 329 (1882), to apply only to property
acquired by married women "in their own right." Id. at 333. The framers of the constitution did
not intend, reasoned the court, to "change the properties and incidents belonging to estates, or to
give married women any greater estates than are conveyed to them by the terms of the instruments
under which they derive title." Id. (emphasis in original).
4. See, e.g., Grabenhoffer v. Garrett, 260 N.C. 118, 131 S.E.2d 675 (1963) (creditor with
outstanding judgment against H may not have receiver appointed to possess and rent entirety
property); Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 109 S.E.2d 205 (1959) (tax foreclosure proceeding
brought solely against H, in whose name entirety property listed on tax rolls; foreclosure sale
against entirety property ineffective).
5. Freeze v. Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424 (1970).
6. See, e.g., D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976); Robinson v. Trous-
dale County, 516 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1974).
7. See text accompanying notes 83-136 infra.
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nor, of course, could they take up arms to defend their property.8 To
the feudal mind, therefore, it was practically as well as legally consis-
tent to deny W all present rights in entirety property.
I
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
A tenancy by the entirety is created in North Carolina whenever a
husband and wife take joint title to real property,9 in the absence of
evidence of an intention that the property be held in some other way.'0
As at common law, H has exclusive rights to use and control entirety
property and to receive all rents" and profits therefrom for the dura-
tion of the estate. 2 Whas no right to an accounting for profits,"3 and
should H elect to lease the property, conveying his exclusive right to
present possession to a third party, the third party can exclude Wfrom
the property.' 4 Neither tenant is entitled to partition.' 5 Each tenant
8. See generally Phipps, supra note 3.
9. Eg., Combs v. Combs, 273 N.C. 462, 465, 160 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1968).
10. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found the words "to share equally" in a convey-
ance to H and W sufficient to rebut the presumption of a tenancy by the entirety and create a
tenancy in common. Dearman v. Bruns, 11 N.C. App. 564, 181 S.E.2d 809, cert. denied, 279 N.C.
394, 183 S.E.2d 241 (1971). The court noted that had the conveying words "to my daughter Min-
nie and [her husband] Shaw Brown" not been accompanied by "to share equally", the presump-
tion of tenancy by the entirety would have survived. Id. at 565-66, 181 S.E.2d at 811. In Freeze v.
Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424 (1970), for example, the court inferred that a tenancy by
the entirety had been created solely on the basis of H and Ws joint ownership of real property.
Id. at 181, 171 S.E.2d at 426.
North Carolina does nbt recognize tenancy by the entirety in personalty. Turlington v. Lu-
cas, 186 N.C. 283, 119 S.E. 366 (1923).
11. See, e.g., Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937) (right to crops grown on entirety
property exclusively H's); Hodge v. Hodge, 12 N.C. App. 574, 183 S.E.2d 800 (1971) (right to rents
from entirety property exclusively B's).
In Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.E.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1974), Justice Henry in dictum
posed the hypothetical of a husband and wife with no assets other than an apartment house
purchased as tenants by the entirety with money inherited by each and pooled. The court indi-
cated that at common law H would be free to appropriate all rents and W would have no remedy
short of divorce. In North Carolina such a Wmay have a resulting trust remedy, but no case has
presented these facts.
12. Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552 (1973).
13. North Carolina Bd. of Architecture v. Lee, 264 N.C. 602, 610, 142 S.E.2d 643, 649 (1965).
14. Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937).
15. Jones v. W.A. Smith & Co., 149 N.C. 317, 319, 62 S.E. 1092, 1093 (1908). If both parties
desire partition, they must first execute jointly an instrument conveying the property to each other
as tenants in common. Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 534-35, 245 S.E.2d 87, 89
(1978).
A partition sale may be desirable yet unobtainable when H and Ware separated but not
divorced. This was the situation in Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583 (D. Mass. 1973), aft'd, 416
U.S. 953 (1974), and D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976). "If the two spouses
are not in happy relations, and no divorce is obtainable, the veto power of each on a sale places a
premium on the aggressiveness, bargaining skill and obstinacy of the more persistent spouse." 4A
R. POWELL, supra note 3, 623 at 702.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
has a right of survivorship that cannot be directly defeated by the other
tenant.'6 Unless both tenants join in a voluntary conveyance, the estate
endures until one party dies or until an absolute divorce is decreed. 17
When entirety property is voluntarily sold, the tenancy is dissolved
and the proceeds are held in common, with each spouse entitled to one-
half. 8 When entirety property is condemned, however, the North Car-
olina Supreme Court has held 9 that the involuntary sale20 does not
destroy the character of the tenancy by the entirety. Because the pro-
ceeds from the sale are under -'s exclusive control, nothing prevents
him from spending the entire amount, thereby indirectly defeating Ws
survivorship interest. Under no circumstance, however, can W defeat
,Ws survivorship right.
Various judicial presumptions have developed around the entirety
estate in North Carolina. In addition to the presumption that a convey-
ance of real proeprty to H and W creates a tenancy by the entirety,
North Carolina law presumes that when H contributes the entire
purchase price of entirety property he intends to make a gift of a half
interest to W.21 This presumption can be rebutted only by "clear,
strong and convincing evidence" that H intended the property to be
held for his benefit alone.22 When W contributes the entire purchase
price, however, the law presumes that she acted under R's coercion and
that her true intent is to create a resulting trust for herself alone rather
than make a gift of a half interest to H.23 Although early cases de-
scribed this presumption as irrebuttable,24 the question has not been
16. L. & M. Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 552, 161 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1968); Moore v. Shore,
208 N.C. 446, 448, 181 S.E. 275, 276 (1935).
17. Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C. 458, 121 S.E.2d 857 (1961); Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C.
App. 532, 245 S.E.2d 87 (1978).
18. Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947).
19. N.C. Highway Comm'n v. Myers, 270 N.C. 258, 154 S.E.2d 87 (1967). The case was
criticized in Note, 47 N.C.L. REv. 963 (1969).
20. What constitutes an "involuntary sale" is hard to predict in North Carolina. The
supreme court has held that a loss by fire dissolved a tenancy by the entirety, entitling each spouse
to one-half the insurance proceeds. Carter v. Continental Ins. Co. of New York, 242 N.C. 578, 89
S.E.2d 122 (1955). The court gave no reason for the distinction it drew between condemnation
and insurance'loss; it focused only on the interest of Win the proceeds despite H being the sole
beneficiary under the policy. Cf. Perry v. Jolly, 259 N.C. 306, 130 S.E.2d 654 (1963) (sale involun-
tary because Wwas incompetent; therefore tenancy by entirety not terminated and H the trustee
of sale proceeds for survivor).
21. Morton v. Blades Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 278,70 S.E. 467 (1911); Rauchfuss v. Rauchfuss,
33 N.C. App. 108, 234 S.E.2d 423 (1977).
22. Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 531, 114 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1960); Huss v. Huss, 31 N.C.
App. 463, 467, 230 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1976).
23. Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669, 107 S.E.2d 530 (1959).
24. Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N.C. 223, 62 S.E. 910 (1908).
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litigated recently, and contemporary commentators assume that the
presumption is rebuttable.25 When W conveys property to herself and
H, however, the law does not presume a resulting trust; by statute, a
tenancy by the entirety is created absent a contrary intention expressed
in the conveyance. 26  Furthermore, the resulting trust theory applies
only when Wcontributes the purchase price; it does not apply when W
makes contributions for improvements to property paid for by H.27
While North Carolina law is clear when either party paid the entire
purchase price, no North Carolina case establishes the interests of
spouses when both of them make contributions to the purchase of en-
tirety property.28
These presumptions, however, have not been accepted wholeheart-
25. See 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 113, at 63 (1963); J. WEBSTER, REAL
ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 102, at 112 (1971). See also Note, Taxation-The Creation
and Termination of Tenancies by the Entiret--A Comparison of Federal andNorth Carolina Estate,
nieritance and Gift Taxation, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 308 (1979).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.3(b) (1976). In Skinner v. Skinner, 28 N.C. App. 412, 222
S.E.2d 258 (1976), the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected a resulting trust claim by
defendant W, who paid for real property prior to her marriage, then conveyed the property to H
and Wafter their marriage. No contrary intention having been expressed in the conveyance, a
tenancy by the entirety was found; Ws claim that she did not intend a gift to H was unavailing.
The court noted that a different result would obtain if the land had been deeded to H and W for
consideration furnished by W. Id. at 416, 222 S.E.2d at 262.
27. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS, § 74, at 276 (5th ed. 1973). In Branstet-
ter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 245 S.E.2d 87 (1978), the court of appeals declined to find a
resulting trust in improvements to real property paid for by Wseveral years after the acquisition
of the property, when H had paid the original purchase price. Id. at 537, 245 S.E.2d at 91.
28. Under general resulting trust theory, a trust can result from payment of part of the
purchase price. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 27, at 277-79.
Most courts will decree a resulting trust based on part payment, regardless of its size or the
fraction of the price paid. Id. at 277. Strong evidence of part payment, however, must be
presented by the claimant. See, e.g., In re Estate of Jarodsky, 122 Ill. App. 2d 243, 248, 258
N.E.2d 365, 368 (1970) ("clear, convincing, unequivocal and unmistakeable"). A few courts re-
quire that such payment be for a specific fractional interest in the property and not a general
contribution toward the entire purchase price before a resulting trust can arise. See Staton v.
Moody, 208 Okla. 372, 256 P.2d 409 (1953). This requirement would rarely be met when H and
Wpurchase property as tenants by the entirety. The requirement runs counter, however, to the
implied-in-fact theory of resulting trusts, under which it is assumed that the parties did not ex-
pressly agree regarding who would own how much of the property.
As the resulting theory was developed for cases in which title was taken in the name of one
person, its application to joint ownership such as tenancy by the entirety is understandably diffi-
cult. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 27, at 271. The part-payment issue could arise in
an entirety situation if, for example, H claimed beneficial entitlement to entirety property, and W
counterclaimed for a portion of the property for which W allegedly to have paid. The counter-
claim would not be reached unless a resulting trust were found in favor of H because, without
such a finding, the estate would be a tenancy by the entirety, in which there are no divisible
interests. Should the counterclaim be reached, it is hard to predict the result in North Carolina.
The Branstetter rule against finding a resulting trust on improvements to previously purchased
property is consistent with the general rule on that question, suggesting that North Carolina may
follow the general rule regarding part payments and allow a resulting trust if all requirements
were met and the evidence were strong. It could be argued, however, that Branstetter reflects a
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edly. An authority on North Carolina family law challenged these pre-
sumptions, questioning whether H is more aware of the legal effect of
his act or more likely to have intended a gift than W; he stated, "[i]t is
not believed that husbands have a greater affection for their wives than
wives have for their husbands." 29 In addition, the enactment of G.S.
§ 39-13.3(b),30 under which a conveyance of property from W to W
and H creates a tenancy by the entirety, and the unwillingness of the
court of appeals to extend the resulting trust theory to improvements to
real property,31 suggest that both the legislature and the courts are
somewhat uncomfortable with these sex-based presumptions. These
developments, therefore, may foreshadow the elimination of these pre-
sumptions altogether.
An underlying reason for the retention of the entirety estate may
be the idea that H provides the purchase price in most cases and is,
therefore, entitled to exclusive use and control of the property. Today,
with sixty-eight percent of all married women in North Carolina in the
labor force, either working or actively seeking work32 , this rationale is
questionable. Whether or not Wcontributes directly to the purchase of
entirety property, her economic contribution frees money that other-
wise would not be available for housing. W should not be penalized
for spending her earnings on groceries rather than the house payment.
Yet, short of divorce or the death of her H, the W who contributes
general discomfort with resulting trusts on entirety property; if this is true, the issue of part pay-
ment could be avoided altogether by denying the original claim.
In Wall v. Wall, 24 N.C. App. 725, 212 S.E.2d 238, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 264, 214 S.E,2d 437
(1975), both husband and wife had made contributions to the mortgage payments on real prop-
erty, but the question of the affect under a resulting trust theory was not raised. Plaintiff former
husband in Wall sued to partition entirety property, and his former wife counterclaimed for reim-
bursement for mortgage payments that she alone had made for more than 5 of the 25 years during
which they had owned the property. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of the
former wife's claim, stating that, although the divorce dissolved the tenancy by the entirety, the
payments for which she sought reimbursement had been made during its duration and that reim-
bursement can be claimed only by a tenant in common, not by an entirety tenant. The former
wife did not advance a resulting trust theory, perhaps out of an awareness that mortgage payments
cannot be the basis for a resulting trust claim, both because they are not made directly toward the
purchase price and because they are made after the conveyance occurred. G.C. BOGERT & G.T.
BOGERT, supra note 27, § 74 at 199.
29. 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 113, at 64-65 n.39. The author expressed no opinion regarding
the presumption of coercion by H.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.3(b) (1976) provides that "[a] cohveyance of real property, or
any interest therein, by a husband or a wife to such husband and wife vests the same in the
husband and wife as tenants by the entirety unless a contrary intention is expressed in the convey-
ance."
31. Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 245 S.E.2d 87 (1978).
32. NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF ADMINISTRATION, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY Or 1978
(1980).
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economically to the household has no more fights in entirety property
than the full-time homemaker.33
Present rights to entirety property are clearly unequal and that ine-
quality is obviously based on sex. The inequality is especially apparent
when a separated W petitions a court for the fight to occupy entirety
property. While she may be successful in her petition, her success de-
pends on a showing, not of joint ownership, but of entitlement to ali-
mony.
34
In 1944 a committee of the American Bar Association recom-
mended that tenancy by the entirety be abolished because of the "op-
portunity it affords for frustrating the rights of the creditors of one
spouse. 35 Under the pure form of the estate, creditors cannot attach
any part of entirety property,36 but because of B's superior present
rights in such property, I's creditors can reach his interest.37 This rule
has prevailed in Massachusetts, where entirety property is completely
unprotected from I's creditors,38 who can attach and sell his interest.39
Few entirety states, however, follow the pure Massachusetts rule; most
protect entirety property from creditors of both spouses to some de-
33. Cf. Starling, The Tenancy by the Entireties in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 111 (1961),
advocating the retention of tenancy by the entirety in Florida where, unlike North Carolina, en-
tirety tenants share equally in use and control of entirety property. Starling states:
The wife's contribution may consist only of keeping the house and rearing the children,
but who is to say that this contribution is not as important as that of the wage earner?
Recognition of the tenancy by the entireties partially gives effect to the theory of commu-
nity property that husband and wife should share equally in property acquired during
coverture.
Id. at 152.
34. Hinton v. Hinton, 17 N.C. App. 715, 195 S.E.2d 319 (1973). The trial court had found W
not dependent and denied alimony pendente lite, yet granted her exclusive possession of entirety
property. The court of appeals rejected this decision as "contradictory and mutually inconsis-
tent," id. at 17, 195 S.E.2d at 321, because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7 (1976) authorizes transfer of
possession only as a means of paying alimony or alimony pendente lite, for which a showing of
both dependency and need is a prerequisite under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1976). The court
stated that "[u]nless the wife claiming support is entitled to alimony or alimony pendente lite, she
is not entitled to exclusive possession and use of her husband's entirety property." 17 N.C. App. at
717, 195 S.E.2d at 321 (emphasis added).
Under this rule W could not occupy entirety property if she failed to show entitlement to
alimony. An adulterous W, then, could never occupy entirety property because she would never
be entitled to alimony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6 (1976).
35. ABA SEcTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON CHANGES IN SUBSTANTIVE REAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES 82-83 (1944).
36. Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929).
37. Raptes v. Pappas, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927).
38. Whether the Massachusetts rule still prevails in regard to Ws creditors is not certain.
The creditors of a bankrupt Win Massachusetts brought a successful equal protection challenge
to their unequal treatment in Friedman v. Harold, [1977-78] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) § 9502.205
(D. Mass. 1977).
39. Raptes v. Pappas, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927).
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In North Carolina the uncertain position of the B's creditors has
caused much litigation.41 The rule to be drawn from the cases is that
income from entirety property can be reached by IBs creditors once H
himself has severed the income, or the income-producing product, from
the land, but creditors cannot reach I's interest if the entirety property
is not producing income.42 For example, in 1906 the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the grant of an injunction to Wto restrain the
cutting of timber on entirety property by a purchaser of the timber
from H.43 If the property is used for farming, the 1937 decision of the
supreme court in Lewis v. Pate" apparently permits a creditor to attach
severed crops. In Lewis, a creditor of defendant H successfully claimed
the right to levy upon severed crops raised on entirety property to sat-
isfy a judgment against H. In a more recent case, Hodge v. Hodge,4"
the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld an order placing rents
from entirety property into receivership to be applied against B's debts.
Three years later, however, in L.E. Johnson Produce v. Massengill,46 the
court limited the application of Hodge to cases in which entirety prop-
erty was already being rented. In Johnson Produce, a judgment credi-
tor of H sought unsuccessfully to have a receiver appointed to possess
and rent the land. Thus, if the property is already producing rental
income, these funds are vunerable to B-'s creditors; but the debtor-H
cannot be compelled to rent the property. H can escape all liability to
creditors, however, by conveying his interest in entirety property to W
40. Phipps, supra note 3, at 39. The degree to which present and future rights in entirety
property can be reached by separate creditors varies considerably from state to state.
41. See, e.g., Grabenhoffer v. Garrett, 260 N.C. 118, 131 S.E.2d 675 (1963) (creditor with
outstanding judgment against H may not have receiver appointed to possess and rent entirety
property); Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 109 S.E.2d 205 (1959) (tax foreclosure sale against
entirety property ineffective, even though property listed on tax rolls in Tfs name only). Cf. L.E.
Johnson Produce v. Massengill, 23 N.C. App. 368, 208 S.E.2d 709 (1974) (appointment of receiver
for H/s creditor "to collect the rents and profits from the tobacco allotment on said [entirety]
lands" upheld).
42. See, e.g., L. & M. Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968) (Hfs creditor
may not challenge conveyance of entirety property from H to Was fraudulent because creditor
had no right to be paid out of conveyed property); Grabenhofer v. Garrett, 260 N.C. 118, 121, 131
S.E.2d 675, 677 (1963) (Hs creditor not entitled to appointment of receiver to possess and rent
entirety property).
43. Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 53 S.E. 478 (1906).
44. 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937).
45. 12 N.C. App. 574, 183 S.E.2d 800, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 726, 184 S.E.2d 884 (1971).
46. 23 N.C. App. 368, 208 S.E.2d 709 (1974). The trial court had appointed a receiver "to
rent and collect the rents and profits from the tobacco allotment on said land." Id. at 368, 208
S.E.2d at 710. The court of appeals deleted "rent and" and affirmed the order as modified. Id.
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without fear that the conveyance will be set aside as fraudulent.47
No North Carolina case deals with the question of a claim by a
creditor of W against entirety property. A North Carolina court would
probably reach the same result as did the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court in Page v. Donnelly,48 however, and deny creditors the right
to reach Ws interest.
Tort plaintiffs as well as creditors may find themselves disadvan-
taged by entirety rules. A tort plaintiff who has been injured on en-
tirety property may recover against H; whether W can be held
personally liable, however, is uncertain. In Whitehead v. Margel,49 a
case involving a claim against H and W for personal injury occurring
on entirety property, then United States District Judge Craven asserted
that "[h]owever peculiar a tenancy by the entirety may be, it is not a
shield for a tortious wife."' 0 Noting that in North Carolina the attri-
butes of tenancy by the entirety derive at least in part from the marital
relationship rather than from the estate itself,51 Judge Craven inter-
preted North Carolina law to allow a negligence claim against a W
who could be shown to have exercised control over the property. Find-
ing the question of control of entirety property not determined by the
mere fact of an entirety estate, Judge Craven denied Ws motion to
dismiss the case against her on the ground that she was an improper
party. 2 Should Wbe found to have exercised control in fact, then her
inferior position would not protect her from liability.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, seems to have re-
jected this view. In Freeze v. Congleton,53 a case factually similar to
Whitehead, W moved for involuntary nonsuit of a personal injury
claim on the ground that she had no recognizable legal right to control
of the entirety property and, therefore, no duty to keep the premises
safe. Agreeing with W, the supreme court held that because H had
exclusive control of the property, H was solely responsible for the con-
dition of the premises. 4 While a tort claimant seeking recovery against
47. 346 Mass. 768, 193 N.E.2d 682 (1963). The court in Page upheld I's trespass claim
against a third party to whom Whad given permission to cut trees on the basis of f's exclusive
right to possession of entirety property.
48. L. & M. Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968).
49. 220 F. Supp. 933 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
50. Id. at 937.
51. See Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924) and note 3 supra.
52. The case was praised for its flexible application of the spousal unity theory in Note 44
B.U. L. REv. 247 (1964).
53. 276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424 (1970).
54. Id. at 181, 171 S.E.2d at 426.
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a Wmust contend with Freeze, a successful argument under Whitehead
may not be foreclosed. Arguably, Whitehead survived Freeze: the
North Carolina court did not refer to Whitehead; and the court men-
tioned alternate grounds for the decision in the failure of the infant
plaintiff's accompanying parents to warn the infant of a dangerous con-
dition of which the parents were aware. The Whitehead test of control
in fact, however, had it been used in Freeze, would have resulted in a
denial of Ws nonsuit motion, as it was W who closed the unmarked
glass door that injured the infant plaintiff."
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
While the constitutionality of Ws exclusion from the use and con-
trol of entirety property has not been addressed in North Carolina, 56 it
has been litigated elsewhere. 7 For example, in D'Ercole v. D'Ercole,8
an entirety W sought a determination in federal court that Massachu-
setts' tacit approval of -ys right to exclusive possession and control of
entirety property constituted state action in violation of her rights to
equal protection and due process. 59 The court found state action based
55. Id. at 180, Ni1 S.E.2d at 425 (uncontradicted testimony of plaintiffs witness).
56. Although the constitutionality of the estate itself has not been litigated, a North Carolina
district court judge in an unpublished opinion considered the constitutionality of former N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 3 1A-5 (amended 1979), which provided for the disposition of entirety property fol-
lowing the slaying of one spouse by the other. Under the statute, if H slays W', H holds the
property until his death, at which time it passes to Ws estate. If Wslays H, however, one half of
the property passes at once to hs estate, and Wholds the other half until her death, at which time
it also passes to H's estate. The judge concluded that because the treatment of H and W4 is
unequal, the statute impermissibly discriminated against W, in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected this view.
Homanich v. Miller, 28 N.C. App. 451, 221 S.E.2d 739 (1976). The court of appeals found no
discriminatory state action, as is required for violation of the fourteenth amendment, because
"tenancy by the entirety is a purely voluntary method of acquiring and retaining realty." Id. at
455, 221 S.E.2d at 741. Further attacks on this statute have been foreclosed because the legislature
amended the statute to equalize the interests in 1979. Law of May 1, 1979, ch. 572, 1979 N.C.
Sess. Laws -.
57. See e.g., D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976); Robinson v. Trous-
dale County, 516 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1974).
58. 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976).
59. Mrs. D'Ercole provided some portion of the down payment for the disputed property.
Id. at 1379 n.2. During the entire 35 years of her marriage, she was steadily employed and, by
agreement with H, she "assumed financial responsibility for all household expenses, except for
mortgage payments and real property taxes." Id. at 1379.
When the couple separated in 1971, Mr. D'Ercole refused to leave the home and refused to
sell it or share its occupancy with Mrs. D'Ercole. Id. Because he wanted a divorce and she con-
tested, he used his exclusive right of control of the property as a bargaining tool, offering her one-
half the equity in the house if she would agree to a divorce. As the court noted, had she agreed to
a divorce, the tenancy would have been converted to a tenancy in common, and her right to
partition would have been automatic. Id at 1379 n.4.
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on "custom or usage" enforced by the "persistent practices of state offi-
cials."' 60 It also conceded that the concept of tenancy by the entirety
created a sex-based classification favoring males over females.6 ' It did
not, however, find this classification impermissible; it took the position
that the classification was legal because tenancy by the entirety was
only one of several options available to married persons taking title to
real property and because, on the facts presented, Whad freely chosen
tenancy by the entirety.62 The court reserved the question whether ten-
ancy by the entirety is unconstitutional if it is selected "through coer-
cion, ignorance or misrepresentation."
6
The D'Ercole court's reasoning was based largely upon the enact-
ment in 1973 of a statute"' eliminating the presumption that property
taken by married persons in Massachusetts was taken as tenants by the
entirety.6- This reasoning is not persuasive given the facts of D'Ercole,
however, because the presumption still existed in 1965 when the
D'Ercoles acquired their property. It is questionable, therefore,
whether tenancy by the entirety was freely, or even knowingly, chosen
by the parties.66 The court also recognized the importance of preserv-
ing both the parties' and the state's expectations that arise out of the
estate. The court pointed out that H and W may have chosen tenancy
by the entirety "despite or even, perhaps, because of its male oriented
aspects"6 7 and noted the salubrious effect that the impossibility of par-
tition has in "preserving the family homestead even during bitter but
temporary periods of separation."
68
60. Id. at 1381 n.8. The court was not required to clarify its finding of state action because
defendant did not contest this point. Id. In concluding that the requirement had been met, the
court cited Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), for the proposition that a common
law creation can constitute a "custom or usage" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which
Mrs. D'Ercole brought her suit. Id. The court's decision that state action existed may have been
influenced by its desire to reach the merits of the case.
61. Id. at 1382.
62. Id. The court did not discuss the due process claim.
63. Id.
64. Law of April 23, 1973, ch. 210, § 7, 1973 Mass. Acts (codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
184, § 7 (1977)).
65. 407 F. Supp. at 1381 n.8. The statute may have been enacted in response to the decision
of a three-judge panel in Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583 (D. Mass. 1973), affd, 416 U.S. 953
(1974), which upheld the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute denying partition to entirety
tenants. Plaintiff in Klein urged the court to address the question of the constitutionality of ten-
ancy by the entirety itself, finding the question not properly presented, the court expressly left it
open. Id. at 586.
66. See, eg., Finn v. Finn, 348 Mass. 443, 446, 204 N.E.2d 293, 295-96 (1965) (presumption
of tenancy by entirety in jointly owned stock absent express negation in instrument of transfer).
67. 407 F. Supp. at 1382 (quoting Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. at 585).
68. Id. at 1382. The D'Ercole court offered no authority for these justifications, nor for its
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Under North Carolina law, it would be more difficult to justify the
sex-based classification inherent in tenancy by the entirety than in
D'Ercole because the presumption that real property acquired by a
married couple is acquired as tenants by the entirety continues in
North Carolina.69 It has been estimated that ninety percent of married
couples in North Carolina "elect" tenancy by the entirety7 ; quaere
how many of these elections are knowingly made. Relying on the sug-
gestion in D'Ercole that the court may have found the D'Ercoles' ten-
ancy by the entirety unconstitutional if Ws choice of that estate over
other forms of property ownership had been induced by "coercion,
misrepresentation or ignorance," an entirety Win North Carolina may
be able to successfully allege that the estate deprives her of equal pro-
tection because at the time she and H took title to property as tenants
by the entirety she was ignorant of the nature of the estate. Such a lack
of knowledge, combined with the North Carolina presumption favor-
ing tenancy by the entirety, provides the basis for a strong argument
that tenancy by the entirety in North Carolina impermissibly discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex.
The "irrebutable presumption theory" offers another theory under
which a constitutional challenge to tenancy by the entirety might be
mounted. This theory has been described as "a strange hybrid of equal
protection and due process scrutiny"; it is essentially a method of anal-
ysis sometimes utilized by the United States Supreme Court when con-
fronted with a state statute or regulation that allegedly deprives a class
of citizens of some benefit on the basis of a presumption about that
class. 71 The Supreme Court has employed this theory in cases involv-
ing an Illinois statute that denied unwed fathers custody of their chil-
observation that the legislature arguably had not abolished common-law tenancy by the entirety
as a vehicle for acquiring title "because it serves as an effective means for the Commonwealth to
quiet disputes as to possession pending a determination of that issue by the probate court." Id. at
n. 11.
69. See, e.g., Freeze v. Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424 (1970), in which the court,
without examining language of the deed, inferred from plaintiffs allegations that Wand H'jointly
owned their home that they held it as tenants by the entirety. See also Combs v. Combs, 273 N.C.
462, 160 S.E.2d 308 (1968) (conveyance or devise to Hand W creates tenancy by entirety, not
joint tenancy or tenancy in common); Dearman v. Bruns, 11 N.C. App. 564, 181 S.E.2d 809, cert.
denied, 279 N.C. 394, 183 S.E.2d 241 (1971) (conveyance of land to H and W, nothing else ap-
pearing, creates tenancy by entirety).
70. 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 112, at 57 (1963). In a 1980 telephone survey by the author,
68% of persons surveyed owned their own homes; 82% of those owned jointly with her or his
spouse; 79% of those did not know whether they owned as tenants by the entirety and did not
know what was meant by the term.
71. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REv.
1534, 1548 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Irrebuttable Presumpltion].
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dren,7 2 a Connecticut statute that defined "nonresident" for tuition
purposes according to one's legal address at the time application was
made to attend a Connecticut university,7 3 and Cleveland regulations
that required pregnant teachers to take a leave of absence beginning
with their fifth or sixth month of pregnancy and continuing until three
months after delivery.74 In each of these cases the Court focused on the
presumption that attached to the class once the classification had been
chosen: the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit to care for their
children, that pregnant teachers are unfit to teach children, and that an
out-of-state applicant is a nonresident for tuition purposes.75 In no
case did the Court find the free choice to select inclusion within a clas-
sification to be determinative of whether the classification was violative
of due process as did the court in D'Ercole.76 In Tlandis v. Kline 77 the
Court stated that a presumption about a class must be "necessarily -or
universally true in fact" to survive scrutiny and that a presumption that
fell short of this standard may violate due process. If the presumption
is not "universally true," the classification is not held illegal under this
theory, however. The remedy for a finding of a violation is a hearing in
which the complainant has an opportunity to show that she or he was
erroneously included within the classification.78
Applying the irrebuttable presumption theory to tenancy by the
entirety in North Carolina, W could challenge the presumption under-
lying this estate that Ws who hold property as tenants by the entirety
are not competent or not entitled to manage real property. To justify
the presumption, the state must show that it is necessarily true in fact.
It is hard to imagine, however, what sort of evidence the state could
produce to prove its case. If the presumption is held to violate due
process, the state must provide W the opportunity for a hearing at
which W could try to establish that she was as capable as any other
property holder, including a Wwho holds property as a tenant in com-
mon with H, of managing the property.
North Carolina could probably present state interests in support of
retaining the characteristics of tenancy by the entirety, such as the reli-
ance of thousands of property owners on them. In using the irrebut-
72. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
73. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
74. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
75. See generally Irrebuttable Presumption, supra note 71, at 1534.
76. For a discussion of D'Ercole, see notes 58-68 and accompanying text supra.
77. 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
78. See Irrebuttable Presumption, supra note 71, at 1548.
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table presumption theory, however, the United States Supreme Court
has focused less on the state's purpose in so classifying citizens than on
the significance of the right that may be infringed upon by the pre-
sumption.79 While Ws right to deal with property held in her name
may not rise to the level of the right to care for one's natural children as
in Stanley v. Illinoisl° or the right to bear children as in Board of Educa-
tion v. LaFleur,8' it is certainly equally, if not more, significant than the
right to claim a lower tuition rate, which was upheld in landis.2
Therefore, if a North Carolina W can persuade a court to apply the
irrebuttable presumption theory, she should be successful in challeng-
ing her unequal treatment as a tenant by the entirety.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN INCOME TAX LAW RELEVANT TO TENANCY
BY THE ENTIRETY
Aside from the unequal treatment North Carolina accords tenants
by the entirety, an entirety H has reason to challenge the constitution-
ality of the estate because of the undesirable tax consequences he must
often face when transferring appreciated entirety property to Wpursu-
ant to a divorce settlement. This transfer is typically a taxable event,
causing H to recognize gain. In a 1974 Revenue Ruling8 3 the Commis-
sioner described three situations, each of which depicts a "species of
common ownership," in which gain would not be recognized on a
transfer of appreciated property between spouses pursuant to a divorce
settlement: when title to property is taken jointly under state property
law, when the state is a community property state, and when state prop-
erty law is found to be similar to community property law.84 The Com-
missioner stated that when commonly-owned property is unevenly
divided, gain must be recognized by the spouse who receives the lesser
amount. These guidelines, combined with the Commissioner's treat-
ment in Beth W. Corp. v. United States85 of a division of entirety prop-
79. See Comment, The Pri'y Examination: ,4n Analysis of its Consdtiudionalily, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1024 (1976).
80. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
81. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
82. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
83. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
84. Id. at 27.
85. 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), app'd, 481 F.2d 1401 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916
(1974). See also Hornback v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Mo. 1969) in which Wsold
her interest in entirety property to her Hfor cash, causing her to recognize capital gain. Because
Missouri is a community property state as well as a state that recognizes tenancy by the entirety, a
mere division of the property would not have been a taxable transfer.
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erty as a nontaxable event when the property had been distributed
evenly, suggested that gain would not be recognized unless an uneven
division of entirety property were made pursuant to a divorce.
The North Carolina Attorney General had taken an even broader
position in 1969. In his opinion no taxable event would occur upon the
distribution of entirety property pursuant to a divorce settlement until
the property was later sold by the former H or W, regardless of the
share of the property received.8 6 In the fact situation under considera-
tion in the opinion, the parties held their former entirety property as
tenants in common until the year following their divorce, when Wsold
her interest. While the question of a transfer of entirety property be-
tween spouses was not squarely presented, the opinion nevertheless ad-
dressed the basis question presented in Beth W. Corp. and concluded,
similarly to the federal court in Florida, that half the basis in entirety
property87 is attributable to each spouse. The attorney general sup-
ported this conclusion with citations to North Carolina cases that
characterized H's right to use and control entirety property as an inci-
dent of his common-law right of jure uxoris, not as an incident of the
entirety estate itself."'
In a 1975 Revenue Ruling concerning the federal gift tax, how-
ever, the Commissioner placed a somewhat different interpretation on
North Carolina law. 9 This ruling stated that, because an entirety Win
North Carolina has no present right to use or control entirety property,
her interest is only a future interest. The donor of real property given
to his son and daughter-in-law as tenants by the entirety can, therefore,
claim an annual gift tax exclusion only against the son's half.9
On the basis of the authorities considered to this point, the income
86. 40 N.C. ATr'y GuN. REP. 838 (1969). See also 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 120, at 94 n.158
(Cum. Supp. 1976) (Following absolute divorce, a taxable event occurs for the first time when
property, or an interest therein, is sold).
87. 40 N.C. ATr'y GEN. Rap. 839-40 (1969).
88. Id.
89. Rev. Rul. 75-8, 1975-1 C.B. 309.
90. Id. The Commissioner's interpretation of North Carolina law is criticized in Note, Taxa-
tion-The Creation and Termination of Tenancies by the Entiret-A Comparison of Federal and
North Carolina Estate, Inheritance, and Gy? Taxation, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 306, 315-16
(1979). North Carolina courts, as the writer noted, have carefully distinguished between Vs in-
terest in entirety property and the interest of a remainderman, whether vested or contingent. See,
e.g., Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205, 124 S.E. 566, 569 (1924): "[T]he right of survivorship is
merely an incident of the estate, and does not constitute a remainder, either vested or contingent
.... " .Future interest" has been defined as "a legal term, [which] includes reversions, remain-
ders, and other interests or estates .... " Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1958). The phrase "other
interests or estates" indicates a clear intent that the definition not be exhaustive; the position taken
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tax treatment of a transfer of entirety property pursuant to a divorce
settlement is unclear. A line of cases suggests, however, that H would
have to recognize gain. In United States v. Davis,9" the United States
Supreme Court required a Delaware H to recognize capital gain when,
pursuant to a divorce settlement, he transferred his separately-owned,
appreciated DuPont stock to Win return for the release of her marital
rights. H tried to claim that he and W had merely divided their prop-
erty, and that such a division should be nontaxable as it would be in a
community property state. He argued that, because a Delaware di-
vorce court is permitted by statute92 to allocate to W out of B's sepa-
rately-owned property "such share as the Court deems reasonable," W
had inchoate rights in his property as well as her own and thus no
transfer occurred. The Court rejected 's argument, stating that:
the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by the
Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-owner-
ship. The wife has no interest-passive or active-over the manage-
ment or disposition of her husband's personal property. Her rights
are not descendable, and she must survive him to share in his intes-
tate estate. Upon dissolution of the marriage she shares in the prop-
erty only to such extent as the court deems "reasonable."
93
While the property in Davis was personal property owned solely by H,
the Court's language can be applied easily to property held by H and
W as tenants by the entirety in a state like North Carolina. In North
Carolina, if H exchanges entirety property for valuable consideration
from W such as the release of her marital rights, a "sale or exchange"
will occur, requiring H to recognize as capital gain 94 the difference be-
tween his basis in the asset and the fair market value of the considera-
tion received. Under Davis the consideration furnished by W is
presumed to be equal in value to the property received by W in the
by North Carolina courts that Ws interest is not a remainder therefore does not compel a conclu-
sion that it is not a future interest.
The writer also noted the reference in Internal Revenue Code section 2515(c)(l), dealing with
gift tax treatment of tenancies by the entirety, to "the exclusion provided by section 2503(b)," from
which she inferred a congressional intent to allow an exclusion for a gift of entirety property to W.
Note, supra, at 315-16. Because the law of entirety estates varies so much from state to state,
however, it could as easily be inferred that Congress intended to allow the exclusion only to gifts
of entirety property in states in which ownership is accompanied by present rights.
91. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1527(a)(3) (1974).
93. 370 U.S. at 70.
94. I.R.C. § 1222 defines capital gains and losses.
95. I.R.C. § 1001.
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exchange. 96 Therefore, the fair market value of the property deter-
mines the amount of gain.
Most of the cases following Davis have concerned separately-
owned personal property. It might have been expected that such prop-
erty would be found to be co-owned, regardless of inchoate rights
granted by state law. In several cases, however, taxpayers were able to
establish that Ws interest in -'s separately-owned property did, under
state law, rise to the level of co-ownership for purposes of property
division pursuant to a divorce.
In Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,97 the facts were similar to
those in Davis. H transferred separately-owned stock to Wpursuant to
a divorce decree, and a state tax deficiency was assessed against H on a
Davis theory. Collins, having paid the tax under protest, appealed his
case as far as the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Presented with the ques-
tion whether the taxpayer's transfer constituted a "sale or exchange"
within the meaning of the Oklahoma tax code,9" the court, finding that
no taxable event had occurred, answered in the negative. The court
accepted Collins' contention that record title did not determine owner-
ship for purposes of property division pursuant to divorce under the
Oklahoma statute. The court reasoned that, because the statute re-
quired a divorce court to divide equitably all property acquired by the
parties during their marriage, without regard to record title, the statute
created "a species of common ownership" more nearly analogous to
community property ownership than to the inchoate rights of Mrs. Da-
vis in her husband's property under Delaware law.9 9
In its decision, the court distinguished an earlier Tenth Circuit
96. 370 U.S. at 72, Ws basis in the property is its fair market value at the time of the trans-
fer. Id. at 73.
97. 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968). Before the assessment of the state tax deficiency, Collins had
been assessed a federal tax deficiency. He sought relief in the Tax Court. Collins v. Commis-
sioner, 46 T.C. 461 (1966). Seeking to distinguish his situation from Davis', he argued that, under
Oklahoma law, divorce courts are required to recognize Ws present interest in /'s property,
regardless of title. ("As to such property . . . which has been acquired by the parties jointly
during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in either or both of said parties, the court shall
make such division between the parties as may appear just and reasonable .... Okla. Stat. tit.
1961, § 1278 (1979)). The Tax Court rejected this argument, as did the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which found Oklahoma law indistinguishable from the Delaware
law under consideration in Davis. Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968). The
court of appeals was later vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), and on remand the Tenth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision, holding that the transfer was a nontaxable division
among co-owners, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
98. OKLA. STAT. tit. 1951, § 883 (repealed 1971) (recodified at OKLA. CODE AN. § 2358
(Cum. Supp. 1979)).
99. 446 P.2d at 295.
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case, Pulliam v. Commissioner," in which a taxable event was found
on similar facts, on the basis of the different wording of the state stat-
utes under consideration. The Colorado law construed in Pulliam gave
a divorce court discretion to consider various factors in making prop-
erty awards, whereas Oklahoma's law was mandatory, subjecting all
property acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage to equita-
ble division.' The Collins court chastised the Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission and the federal court, which had reached the opposite result in
a federal tax case involving the same taxpayer, for ignoring
Oklahoma's clear law on the subject. 102
After his success in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Collins used
this favorable judgment as the basis for a petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court to review the earlier decision of the
Tenth Circuit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court
of appeals and remanded for reconsideration in light of the decision of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 10 3 On remand, the court of appeals ap-
plied Oklahoma law as stated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to the
federal tax question and held the transfer by Collins to have been a
nontaxable event."to The court thus reversed its previous affirmation of
the tax court.
Application of the "species of common ownership" rule in states
other than Oklahoma has resulted in holdings varying according to
state law. In Imel v. United States105 a Colorado H, having paid capital
gains tax under protest in a situation factually similar to that in Davis
100. 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964).
101. 446 P.2d at 296-97.
102. Id. at 295.
Oklahoma taxpayers in subsequent cases have sought to apply the "species of common own-
ership" rule to transfers between spouses during an ongoing marriage. These attempts have failed
because under Oklahoma law, the ownership rights of the spouse who is not the record owner
arise by virtue not of the marital relationship, but of the divorce action. In Sanditen v. Sanditen,
496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972), W sought to set aside H's gratuitous lifetime transfers of property,
acquired during coverture, of which H was the record owner on the theory that H did not have
the power to transfer this property without Ws consent. The court, however, rejected Ws argu-
ment that her "common ownership" rights voided the transfers, but reversed the trial court's grant
of defendant-estate's demurrer to allow W a chance to show that the transfers were fraudulent
because intended to deny her rights of succession as surviving spouse. In McDaniel v. Oklahoma
Tax Commission, 499 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1972), Hprotested a state gift tax imposed on a transfer to
W, without consideration, of property formerly held in his name alone. Citing Collins, H argued
that the property in question was "commonly owned" before the transfer and therefore not a gift.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, upheld the imposition of the tax, stating that WIs inter-
est recognized in Collins was not a "vested interest." Id. at 1394.
103. 393 U.S. 215 (1968) (per curiam).
104. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
105. 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
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and Collins, sought a refund in the United States District Court. The
court found itself in an awkward position. Colorado law viewed in the
light of the Collins cases appeared to provide the requisite "common
ownership";10 6 yet in Pulliam, decided prior to Collins, the Tenth Cir-
cuit had found a Colorado Wto have no ownership rights in Hs prop-
erty. To resolve its dilemma, the Imel court certified the question
whether, under Colorado law, Ws interest amounted to a "species of
common ownership" to the Colorado Supreme Court. The Colorado
Supreme Court responded that a "species of common ownership"
vested in W at the time the divorce action was filed.' 7 In view of this
response, the United States District Court found the transfer nontax-
able. 10 8 The court of appeals affirmed this decision,"0 9 but did not ex-
pressly overrule its earlier decision in Pulliam. The court noted that W
in Imel had materially aided the accumulation of the family wealth, 10
a factor that distinguished Imel from Pulliam.
Courts in Wisconsin, 1 ' Iowa,"12 and West Virginia," 3 have inter-
preted state law to create no "species of common ownership" of one
spouse in the separate property of the other spouse. In Kansas the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found no "species
of common ownership" in a Davis/Collins fact situation. 1 4 More re-
cently, however, the Kansas Supreme Court reached the opposite result
in a declaratory judgment action to construe Kansas law regarding eq-
uitable division of property pursuant to a divorce." 5
In summary, if a "species of common ownership" is found in sepa-
rately-held property, this property can be transferred between spouses
pursuant to a divorce settlement without tax consequences. Whether
"common ownership" exists depends on the interpretation by state
courts of the state statute governing property division in divorce cases.
If the statute is interpreted to make an equitable property division
mandatory regardless of record ownership, "common ownership" will
106. Id. at 1113. The court conjectured that Colorado law may have been incorrectly inter-
preted in Pulliam and quoted from several Colorado cases in which spouses were found to have
entitlements to property of which the other spouse was record owner. Id. at 1113-15.
107. In re Questions Submitted by United States District Court, 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1973).
108. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, supplemental opinion at 1117 (D. Colo. 1974).
109. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
110. Id. at 857.
111. Kraut v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wisc. 1970).
112. Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971).
113. McKinney v. CIR, 64 T.C. 263 (1975).
114. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
115. Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. 339, 581 P.2d 358 (1978).
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be found. If property division is discretionary, however, record owner-
ship determines whether tax consequences will result from a transfer of
the property.
When property is owned jointly by H and W, as in a tenancy by
the entirety, the same basic question of the spouses' true rights under
state law is presented. This issue, however, has not been heavily liti-
gated. It was presented rather indirectly in Beth W. Corp."16 Several
years after H and W in Beth W. Corp. conveyed various entirety
properties to each other pursuant to a divorce settlement, W trans-
ferred some of the property she received in the settlement to plaintiff-
corporation in exchange for all of the corporation's common stock.
When the corporation sold the property, the issue of the corporation's
basis in the property was raised. If the property settlement was a taxa-
ble event, H should have been taxed on his gain at the time of the
transfer to W. Accordingly, Ws basis in the property would have been
its fair market value at the time of the transfer, which basis would be
carried over to the corporation, resulting in less taxable gain to the cor-
poration upon its sale of the appreciated property. If, however, the
property settlement was a nontaxable division between co-owners, and,
consequently, the corporation took the property with the same basis it
had when owned as entirety property.1 ' The Commissioner asserted
the latter position and prevailed. The corporation paid the deficiency,
then sought a refund in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida. The court distinguished Ws inchoate interest
in B's property under Delaware law, as in the Davis case, from Ws
concrete interest in entirety property under Florida law." 8 After
describing the features of an entirety estate, such as indivisibility and
insulation from individual debts, the court asserted that under a ten-
ancy by the entirety in Florida Wis "in actuality as well as in theory, a
co-owner of the subject property." 19 Unlike in North Carolina, how-
ever, Florida tenants by the entirety have equal rights to use and con-
trol entirety property.
120
More recently the question of spouses' rights in entirety property
has arisen in Massachusetts, where W has no present right to use or
116. 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aftd, 481 F.2d 1401, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
117. I.R.C. § 362(a).
118. 350 F. Supp. at 1191.
119. Id. at 1191.
120. See, eg., Quick v. Leatherman, 96 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1957); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Oates, 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269 (1936).
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control entirety property. In Forbes v. United States,'2' a case with dis-
turbing implications for North Carolina entirety Hs, the Commissioner
found, H's conveyance of his interest in entirety property to W pursu-
ant to a divorce decree to have been a taxable exchange and assessed a
deficiency against H in the amount of one-half the difference between
the cost basis in the property and its fair market value at the time of the
transfer. In suing for a refund in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, H argued that, in granting unequal rights
in entirety property on the basis of sex, the common law of Massachu-
setts violated both the state and federal constitutions. H based his
claim on the right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution and on the equal rights amendment
to the Massachusetts Constitution. 2 H asked the court to decree
equal rights in entirety property and, accordingly, to find a transfer of
the property a nontaxable division between co-owners.
123
The court in Forbes summarily rejected 's fourteenth amend-
ment argument with citations to D'Ercole,l z4 which upheld the consti-
tutionality of tenancy by the entirety against an equal protection
challenge by W, and Klein v. Mayo. 125 The equal rights amendment
argument might have been successful if the property transfer had not
occurred in 1973, three years prior to the ratification of the amendment;
the court, however, declined to apply the amendment retroactively,
stating that the question would have to wait until properly presented.1
26
No reference was made in Forbes to Beth W. Corp., perhaps be-
cause a claim of common ownership would have been inconsistent with
a claim that Massachusetts law was unconstitutional. It is unlikely,
however, that the Forbes court would have found Beth W. Corp. con-
trolling. In analogizing Massachusetts law to the Delaware law applied
in Davis, the Forbes court asserted that "[iln Massachusetts a wife's
interest in property held by the entireties is no greater than that [incho-
121. 472 F. Supp. 840 (D. Mass. 1979).
122. MASS. CONST. art. CVI (1976) amended art. I by adding, "Equality under the law shall
not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, 'olor, creed or national origin:'
123. 472 F. Supp. at 842.
124. 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976). Like the D'Ercole court, the Forbes court apparently
overlooked the date on which the property was purchased. As in D'Ercole, the property was
purchased before 1973, at which time the presumption that property acquired as H and Wwas
acquired as tenants by the entirety still existed. The existence of the legal presumption undercuts
the court's inference of free choice by H. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
125. See note 65 supra.
126. 472 F. Supp. at 842-43.
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ate] interest Delaware grants to a wife in her husband's property."127
This is in contrast to the character of a Florida entirety Ws interest,
which as stated in Beth W. Corp., is "considerably greater than a mere
liability imposed on the interest of the husband" and "attains 'the dig-
nity of co-ownership,' as that phrase is used in Davis."'
128
The transfer of appreciated entirety property from H to W pursu-
ant to a divorce settlement would almost certainly result in taxable gain
to H in North Carolina. Although North Carolina courts have persist-
ently distinguished between the entirety estate and H's rights of exclu-
sive use and control, finding these rights to arise not from the entirety
estate but from B's common-law rights over Ws property, 129 this rea-
soning probably would not persuade the Commissioner to treat a trans-
fer of appreciated entirety property to W incident to a divorce as a
division of commonly-owned property. Tax cases since Davis have fo-
cused on the rights of the transferee spouse to the property at issue. If,
as in tenancy by the entirety in North Carolina, W has no present
rights to the property, the Commissioner is unlikely to consider the ori-
gin of Ws non-rights to be of much importance. While it is true that
under Davis state law on the nature of property rights is controlling,
North Carolina law could hardly be construed as conferring equal
property rights upon an entirety W. Unlike the court that interpreted
Florida law in Beth W. Corp., a North Carolina court could not, con-
sistently with its prior decisions regarding the unequal rights of entirety
tenants during their joint lives, find an entirety wife to be "in actuality
as well as in theory"'3 ° a co-owner with H.
Nor could a North Carolina court find, as have courts in
Oklahoma,131 Wisconsin,11z and elsewhere, a "species of common own-
ership" deriving from mandatory language in the state's statute regard-
ing property division pursuant to a divorce. North Carolina has no
statute regarding division of marital property as such. G.S. 50-16.7,1
33
concerning how alimony shall be paid, confers on the court the right to
transfer title to or possession of personal property or a security interest
127. Id. at 842.
128. 350 F. Supp. at 1191. It is curious that Hin Forbeswas charged with gain on only one-
half the property, although Ws interest in all the property was held to be inchoate. In contrast, H
in Davis was charged with gain on all the transferred stock.
129. Duplin County v. Jones, 267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d 603 (1966); Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C.
682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924).
130. 350 F. Supp. at 1191.
131. Collins v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1974); see note 97 supra.
132. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7 (1976).
1018 Vol. 58
19801 TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY 1019
therein, or to transfer possession of or a security interest in real prop-
erty, but not title to real property. This power in the court is discretion-
ary134 and therefore does not correspond to the mandatory duty of
property division imposed on the courts of Oklahoma, Colorado and
Kansas. 135  The inability of a North Carolina court to transfer title to
real property, even upon a determination that such a transfer would be
equitable, widens the gap between North Carolina law and the law of
states where the "species of common ownership" rule has been found
applicable.
Under the present law of North Carolina, therefore, an entirety H
could not be protected from the recognition of gain from the transfer of
appreciated entirety property to Wpursuant to a divorce settlement.1
36
If he chooses to challenge the assessment of a tax deficiency, he could
make a persuasive argument that the superior rights that he enjoys in
entirety property solely because of his sex, and which had the undesir-
134. BeaU v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).
135. See text accompanying notes 97-115 supra.
136. Alternate arrangements to the described transfer could be made if practical considera-
tions aside from tax consequences would permit. For example, the transfer could be characterized
as a gift rather than an exchange for a release of Ws marital rights. If the gift were effected prior
to the divorce, the gift tax marital deduction as well as the annual exclusion presumably would be
available.
Whether the Commissioner would accept the characterization of the transfer as a gift, how-
ever, is uncertain. In Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836
(1964), Hdid not try to attach the "gift" label; however, in attempting to distinguish his case from
Davis, he pointed out the absence of any express release by W of her marital rights. The court
found the release of marital rights to be implicit in the proceedings. See also Wallace v. United
States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971), in which H claimed Whad
exchanged her marital rights as consideration for property other than the appreciated stock at
issue. The court rejected this argument as an attempt to artificially distinguish Davis by means of
"subtleties in the mechanics by which a husband divests himself of appreciated property in favor
of his wife." Id. at 761. An attempt by a West Virginia Hto characterize his stock transfer to W
as voluntary because state law, at the time the transfer was made, gave Wno Davir-type right to a
share of Hs property pursuant to divorce was also unsuccessful. McKinney v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 263 (1975). The court found, however, that Wrelinquished her rights of descent, distribution
and dower and that the amount of property owned by the parties after the divorce was closely
related to the settlement of the parties' "respective contractual obligations and rights growing out
of dissolution of the marriage contract." Id. at 268. Although these cases all involved transfers
made pursuant to a divorce decree, the approach of the courts in looking beyond the form of the
transaction suggests the possible application of a step-transaction theory by which a "gift" may be
re-characterized as an "exchange" of appreciated property for marital rights, with capital gain
consequences to the transferor.
Alternatively H and W could continue to hold the property after a divorce as tenants in
common. If the property were later sold to a third party, each tenant in common apparently
would recognize gain on one-half the difference between the basis in the property and the selling
price, regardless of inequality of contributions. Wall v. Wall, 24 N.C. App. 725, 212 S.E.2d 238,
cert. denied, 287 N.C. 264, 214 S.E.2d 437 (1975). A full consideration of this or other possible
arrangements, such as a transfer of the property to H rather than W, are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
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able effect of exposing him to this tax liability, violated his right to
equal protection.'37 This argument would be stronger in North Caro-
lina than in Massachusetts because North Carolina, unlike Massachu-
setts, has not statutorily removed the presumption favoring tenancy by
the entirety. H could also argue that tenancy by the entirety violated
his right to due process on an irrebuttable presumption theory, All en-
tirety Hs are presumed to have some sort of superior competence to use
and control real property held by the entirety; because the state affords
no opportunity for H to rebut this presumption, a due process violation
could be found.'38
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
In the early years of this century the North Carolina Supreme
Court more than once invited the legislature to change the entirety es-
tate into a tenancy in common. 139 The legislature, however, never ac-
cepted this invitation, and in more recent years the court has ceased
extending it.' 40 The court, however, has never fully accepted the pure
entirety estate. For example, it has followed the "Massachusetts rule"
of allowing R's creditors to reach entirety property to a limited ex-
tent.' 4' More significantly, it has never extended the estate to personal
property. 42 The rationale offered for not allowing entirety estates in
personal property could easily be applied to real property as well. In
discussing entirety estates in personal property, the court in Turlinglon
v. Lucas stated:
[It] is not only that it is an anomaly in our judicial system, without
any statute recognizing it, and that it is contrary to our policy as to
property rights of women, as stated in the Constitution, but that it
abstracts the property embraced in it from liability to debt during the
joint lives, and that during all this time the husband enjoys the in-
137. A North Carolina H could not, of course, argue that tenancy by the entirety violates the
state equal rights amendment, as North Carolina has not so amended its constitution.
138. See text accompanying notes 71-82 su~pra.
139. See, e.g., Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 53 S.E. 478 (1906), Jones v. W.A. Smith & Co.,
149 N.C. 318, 320, 62 S.E. 1092, 1093 (1908), in which Judge Walker stated:
It may be that the present state of the law as to married women, under the Constitution
and statutes and a wise public policy, call for a change in the incidents and properties of
this anomalous estate.. ., so that it may be turned into a tenancy in common, but this is
a question which addresses itself to the Legislature, and not to us.
140. "The wisdom of an estate by the entireties may be debatable. Nevertheless the principle
is firmly imbedded in our decisions. Perry v. Jolly, 259 N.C. 306, 315, 130 S.E.2d 654, 661
(1963).
141. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
142. 4ccord, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon and Wyoming. Phopps, supra note 3, at
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come from the wife's half of the property, as well as from his own
half. 1
43
North Carolina should follow the example of other states and re-
vise tenancy by the entirety, retaining some aspects of the estate such as
the right of survivorship, 44 while relinquishing its discriminatory fea-
tures.145 Despite legislative inaction, 146 the North Carolina Supreme
Court could effect changes in the law if presented with a proper case.
For example, the court could equalize the judicial presumptions that
arise when one spouse furnishes the entire purchase price for entirety
property' 47 and eliminate the judicial presumption that a transfer of
real property to H and W, nothing else appearing, creates a tenancy by
the entirety. The court could also, as did the Tennessee Supreme Court
in Robinson v. Trousdale County,148 extend to Wthe same rights to use
and control entirety property that H enjoys.
Such a modification of the entirety estate would remove North
Carolina from the tiny minority of states that still retain tenancy by the
entirety in its pure common-law form.' 49 North Carolina entirety Ws
would then be actual as well as theoretical property owners, and a divi-
sion of appreciated entirety property pursuant to a divorce would not
cause North Carolina entirety -'s to recognize gain, as under present
law they almost certainly would. In addition, the fiction of "resulting
trusts" employed to protect Ws who furnished the purchase price for
143. 186 N.C. 283, 287, 119 S.E. 366, 368 (1923).
144. In North Carolina no estate other than tenancy by the entirety has a right of survivorship;
the legislature abolished the survivorship feature of a common-law joint tenancy in 1784. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1976).
145. This is the form tenancy by the entirety takes in the majority of states that continue to
recognize the estate. Phopps, supra note 3, at 31-32.
146. A bill was introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly in 1977 "to equalize
between married persons the right to control, use, possession, rents, income, and profits of real
property held by them in tenancy by the entirety." H. 94, 1977 Gen. Assembly, reprinted in Inst. of
Gov't Daily Bull. No. 12, at 73-74 (Jan. 27, 1977)). This bill has now been "postponed indefi-
nitely." H. 94, 1978 Gen. Assembly, (reprinted in Inst. of Gov't Daily Bull. No. 14, at 129 (June 16,
1978)).
147. See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
148. 516 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1974). Prior to Robinson, two distinct lines of Tennessee cases
reflected judicial uncertainty whether the common law disabilities of coverture remained in effect
in Tennessee. In resolving the conflict, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated: "We do not abolish
the estate of tenancy by the entirety, but we strip it of the artificial and archaic rules and restric-
tions imposed at the common law, and we fully deterge it of its deprivations and detriments to
women and fully emancipate them from its burdens." Id. at 632.
149. Only Massachusetts and Michigan retain the estate in as pure a form as North Carolina.
Although the position of tenancy by the entirety appears precarious in Massachusetts, the law in
Michigan remains unchanged. See, e.g., DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d 38
(1964) (conveyance to Hand W"as joint tenants" creates tenancy by the entirety; presumption of
tenancy by the entirety extended to personal property); In re Estate of Thomas, 341 Mich. 158, 67
N.W.2d 85 (1954) (H entitled to rents from entirety property).
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entirety property could be abandoned. One reason for this fiction-the
presumed coercion of W by H-has been statutorily rejected in an-
other context.150 A perhaps stronger reason for the fiction-Ws une-
qual rights in entirety property-would, of course, be negated by the
abolition of the discriminatory aspects of the entirety estate.
Certain aspects of the estate would remain the same, but their ef-
fects would be ameliorated by the suggested modifications. For exam-
ple, tenants by the entirety would still have no right to partition without
an absolute divorce; but, with equal rights in entirety property, a North
Carolina W who is divorced from bed and board or separated would
not find herself locked out with no remedy, as in Klein and D'Ercole.
The extension to W of present rights in entirety property would
presumably render those rights vulnerable to creditors to the same ex-
tent as are I's present rights; the creditors of neither spouse could
claim more than half these present rights. While this effect would not
be beneficial to entirety tenants themselves, it would be much fairer to
Ws creditors than is the present state of the law. Full fairness to credi-
tors would require North Carolina to go still further, and allow access
by the creditors of both spouses to as much as the spouses may volunta-
rily transfer.1
5 1
Tenancy by the entirety developed during a feudal age, when W
was legally nonexistent and disadvantaged by lack of education in han-
dling property. Today, however, W exists in the eyes of the law, her
education level may be higher than -'s, and she is likely to hold a job
outside the home from which she contributes to family purchases. Yet
exclusive use and control of entirety property continues to reside in H.
For his superior rights H may, however, pay a price in capital gains
tax.
Tenancy by the entirety may have been a good idea in a feudal
age. Today, however, no possible justification can be conjured up in
150. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6, which required that Wbe privily examined in connec-
tion with any contract made with Hregarding her real estate, was repealed in 1977. Law of May
13, 1977, ch. 375, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 375.
151. In (Arkansas, New Jersey, New York and Oregon), states where the interest of one
spouse can be sold at an execution sale the purchaser becomes a tenant in common with the other
spouse but cannot force partition. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 3, 623, at 703-04 (1979). In Ken-
tucky and Tennessee, howev, er, each spouse can convey her or his contingent right of survivorship
but not present possession. Id. at 702. Similarly, in North Carolina the transferee of an entirety
tenant's right of survivorship may be able to assert that interest under the doctrine of after-ac-
quired title by estoppel. Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960); Keel v. Bailey, 224
N.C. 447, 31 S.E.2d 362 (1944). See also J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
§ 114 (1971).
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support of its continued existence in its present form. The General As-
sembly should change the estate; in the absence of legislative action,
the supreme court should itself take the opportunity, if presented in a
proper case, to modernize the estate.
JANE HARPER PORTER

